Analysis of Trump’s Preliminary Plan for “Russia-Ukraine peace”

After Donald Trump officially confirmed his win in 2024 U.S. presidential election and is about to start his second administration, one of the most concerned issues among the international community is the "end of the Russo-Ukrainian war within 24 hours" proclaimed by him previously. Some analysts believed that Trump would rudely terminate the three-year war by abandoning Ukraine and favoring Russia. It is not a groudless speculation. On the one hand, having demonstrated the dissatisfaction with Ukraine, Trump not only mocked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as "the best salesman", since "every time he (Zelensky) visits the United States, he can take away about 60 billion US dollars", but also blamed him for the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. On the other hand, Trump's intimate personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has also invoked suspicion.

The reactions of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine to Trump's victory also attracted attention. Zelensky congratulated Trump at the first opportunity, which was interpreted as an "uneasy flattery". Putin's responses, nevetheless, looked more tricky - he did not call to Trump for congratulating the big win at once as he did in 2016. Instead, on the morning of November 6, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov indicated a non-enthusiastic response that "we are talking about an unfriendly country who involved in the war against our country in any forms". However, on the following day (November 7), Putin publicly sent his congratulations to Trump, and called Trump, who unexpectedly underwent attempted assassination in July this year, a "brave man."

Within the shifts of Russian leaderships' attitude, what firstly took place was that Trump and Zelensky had a 25-minute phone call, and both seemed satisfied with the conversation. Trump said that he "will not give up Ukraine, but hopes to give diplomacy a chance." On the other hand, according to Zelensky's statements on social media and internal sources, this "wonderful call went very well" and did not make Zelensky despaired. In fact, regardless of the content of the conversation, an immediate call shortly after the victory should be treated as a positive signal, demonstrating that the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine would become one of Trump's priorities in his second term.

Second, according to Washington Post, Trump subsequently had a phone call with Putin, in which he advised Russia not to escalate the conflict and reminded him that "the United States has a prominent military presence in Europe" (Note: After the article was completed, the Kremlin denied the news). Like Ukraine, Russia seems also optimistic with the call with Trump. As suggested by Putin, although Russia will not change its demands, he is ready to talk to Trump. In addition, on November 10, Peskov said in an interview that the signs of an improved Russian-US relations look possible. "At least he (Trump) is talking about peace, not confrontation, nor the desire of a strategic defeat against Russia", said by Peskov.

The third signal, which is the one with the richest information, is that according to insiders, the Trump team has already proposed a "preliminary plan" for the Russo-Ukrainian issue. The specific key details include that (1) Ukraine would not to join NATO for at least 20 years; (2) In exchange, the U.S. will continue to provide Ukraine with a great number of weapons to resist Russia's "potential threats"; (3) Russia and Ukraine will establish an 800-mile demilitarized zone -- Although it remains unclear that who will be responsible for the management of the zone, the peacekeeping force is said to not come from the U.S., nor the international organizations funded by the U.S. (such as the United Nations) are included; (4) The work of maintaining peace is likely to be undertaken by Poland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.

Despite a preliminary plan rather than the final decision, it provides plenty of information compared to the previous "plans" or "proposals" that lacked practical details. Prior to this, it has been suggested that there were two proposals for the Russo-Ukrainian war based on different factions within the Republican Party. One of them, with the representatives of former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, called for a harsher stance against Russia. Yet, the speculation that Pompeo might become Trump's new Secretary of Defense have already been overturned by Trump. The other faction, including Richard Grenell, who is speculated to be the next US Secretary of State or National Security Advisor, considers ending the war by forcing Ukraine to make major concessions.

▲ 特朗普表示不会邀请前美国国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥加入政府

The significance of Trump's forthcoming presidency for the Russo-Ukrainian war is to "break the deadlock." The policy of Biden administration (especially in the later period) on the Ukraine issue was more of "keeping the surface", which led to a procrastination, and also caused waste of resources and inefficiency. In terms of aid to Ukraine, despite continued economic and military investment, a series of restrictions, such as weapon usage procedures and maintenance procedures, have limited the effect of the aid. Take the issue of weapon maintenance as an example. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Biden administration has required Ukraine to transport US-supplied weapons out of the country for maintenance, or to repair the system in Ukraine under the conditions of remote meetings with the participation of the United States. Although the Biden administration decided to allow the Pentagon to lift the ban on contractors repairing US-supplied weapons in Ukraine after Trump announced his victory, the ban has caused slow repairs and technical difficulties in the past three years, resulting in many equipment in the country being damaged and unusable, resulting in a waste of resources. As for Russia, the ineffectiveness and backlash of sanctions were exposed as early as the beginning of the conflict, but they have continued. It was not until after Trump's victory that Jake Sullivan, the US President's National Security Advisor, admitted on November 10 that "anti-Russian sanctions have not caused Russia to lose its ability to conduct special military operations in Ukraine."

Among the four details of the "preliminary plan", the first three are intended to play the role of "compromise, balance, and buffer", while the last one is in line with Trump's advocacy of "cutting US investment", "reducing losses to US interests", and "increasing European/NATO investment costs". First of all, the provision that Ukraine cannot join NATO within a specified period of time is the most direct solution to the root of this conflict and the one that is most likely to appear in the final decision, but the specific restriction period is still under discussion. This provision not only maintains the "original judgment" on the issue of "Ukraine joining NATO" many times before, but also (at least in the provisions) does not completely and permanently reject this possibility. In Trump's view, it is necessary to give a specific numerical period limit to "delaying Ukraine's entry into NATO" at the moment.

假设以“初步方案”中的20年为例，若最早在特朗普正式就职第二任期后立即生效，俄罗斯关于北约东扩的焦虑可以在时间上得以缓解，并且到2045年，届时的俄罗斯政府或将在乌克兰问题上有新的协商时间和空间。而在此期间，美国为乌克兰持续供应武器则可以延续在俄西侧控制风险的能力，但这又回到了关于武器使用的具体细节问题。

至于管理“缓冲区”和维和工作的问题，“初步方案”已经对准了其他北约成员国，而这或许是新一届特朗普政府在北约问题上不那么激进的“折中”方案。此前，特朗普曾公开表示对美国向北约投入成本过高的不满，主张对任何不符合国防开支指导方针的北约成员国削减保护，甚至曾考虑过“退约”计划。从这个角度说，要求北约其他成员国负责分担战后维护工作，将增加相关国家的经济和军事投入成本。

欧洲目前对于特朗普的回归体现出一种“骚动”状态。11月7日，在布达佩斯举行的欧洲领导人会议上，50 位世界领导人共同制定应对特朗普的战略。欧洲大陆的领导人正试图抵御特朗普发动贸易战、减少对美国安全保护伞的依赖，并维持美国对乌克兰的支持。然而，许多分析认为情况并不乐观。许多（曾）在北约任职的官员认为，无论如何，俄乌冲突最终或都将以乌克兰割让20%的领土而告终。支持这一看法的人士包括前北约指挥官詹姆斯·斯塔夫里迪斯（James G. Stavridis）、前北约军事委员会主席、现任捷克总统彼得·帕维尔（Petr Pavel）等。至于所割让领土的具体去向，多数分析认为将归于俄罗斯所有，即冲突最终以乌克兰妥协告终。

▲ 前北约军事委员会主席、现任捷克总统彼得·帕维尔（Petr Pavel）

基于目前的既有信息，俄乌冲突的走向开始有所明朗，未来或将朝向几个趋势发展：第一，外交解决或将更快速地实施，与冲突爆发早期不同的是，其他的“干扰性因素”将会在双方回归谈判桌前被“妥善安顿”。第二，美国援助的削减将是大势所趋，这从拜登政府紧急计划在明年1月特朗普就职典礼前匆忙发放对乌克兰剩余的60多亿美元安全援助中的最后一笔资金中可见一斑。第三，北约集团中的欧洲成员国将成为未来援助的主力，这意味着一些欧洲大国国家将不得不进一步增加开支。第四，美俄、美乌之间或将快速达成协议，协议在短期内或将折损部分乌克兰方面的利益，但长期将控制俄罗斯带来的风险。对于一直以来的“僵点”领土问题，所占领土是否最终归属俄罗斯所有仅为其中一种可能性，也不排除未来这些领土将以“中立”的性质存在——而至于如何“安抚”作为（被迫）让步方的乌克兰，或许只是时间问题。特朗普很可能会做出其他人一直不愿也不敢轻易做出的决定。